

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 106255

FOLLOWING REPEAT USUN NEW YORK 1624 ACTION STATE INFO GENEVA  
USNATO BELGRADE BUCHAREST LONDON NEW DELHI PARIS APR 22.

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 1624

E.O. 11652:GDS  
TAGS: PARM, UNGA  
SUBJECT: UNSSOD PREPCOM V: WRAP-UP

1. SUMMARY. WITH ONE MONTH REMAINING BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD), THE LAST ROUND OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE HAS PRODUCED A HEAVILY BRACKETED TEXT WHICH UNDERSCORES THE DEEP DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH AND EXPECTATION AMONG THE REGIONAL GROUPS AND MAJOR STATES. THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP WANTS THE SSOD TO MARK A FRESH DEPARTURE IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT EFFORTS, AND ARE SUSPICIOUS THAT US AND USSR HAVE ADOPTED A DAMAGE-LIMITING APPROACH DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THE ROLE OF THE UN AND THE SSOD IN THESE ENDEAVORS. THEY ALSO WANT THE SSOD TO PRODUCE GREATER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN DISARMAMENT, AND VIEW THE US AND USSR AS PREFERRING TO CONFIDENTIAL

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MAINTAIN A "CLOSED CLUB" ATTITUDE. EXPECTATIONS THAT EITHER SALT II OR CTB WOULD BE CONCLUDED BY THE SSOD ARE NOW BEING REPLACED BY SENSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT AND FRUSTRATION AT SLOWNESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHEN THEY MAY BE COMPLETED. NON-ALIGNED AND OTHERS ARE STILL LOOKING TO US AND USSR TO COME UP WITH JOINT APPROACH ON KEY NUCLEAR ISSUES FOR THE PROGRAM OF ACTION. MANY DELS HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR SSOD TO BE A SUCCESS UNLESS US PRODUCES INITIATIVES, PARTICULARLY IN NUCLEAR FIELD. PROSPECTS FOR ATTAINING CONSENSUS AT SSOD ARE PROBLEMATIC AND SOME

DELEGATIONS HAVE SPOKEN OPENLY OF POSSIBILITY OF VOTING ON TEXTS IF NEGOTIATING EFFORTS COLLAPSE. WITH MANY WORLD LEADERS PLANNING TO ATTEND, SSOD CLEARLY IS GOING TO BE AN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL EVENT. USDEL BELIEVES THAT A MAJOR ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT CONTAINING UPDATED REPORT ON OUR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND HOPEFULLY INCLUDING NEW INITIATIVES IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR ATTAINMENT OF US OBJECTIVES AT THE SSOD. END SUMMARY

2. MOOD AND ATMOSPHERE AT END OF SSOD PREPCOM V. THE RESULTS OF DELIBERATIONS ON THE DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE SSOD AT THE FINAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE SESSION HAVE PRODUCED A MOOD OF FRUSTRATION OVER LACK OF PROGRESS IN SETTLING OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THERE IS INCREASING CRITICISM OF THE US AND THE USSR OVER OUR PERCEIVED FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE DEMANDS OF THE MAJORITY OF MEMBERS -- ESPECIALLY THE NON-ALIGNED -- WHO WANT THE SSOD TO MARK A SIGNIFICANT NEW DEPARTURE IN DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS. VIEWS AND DIFFERENCES HAVE CRYSTALLIZED ON THE KEY ISSUES IN THE DOCUMENTS. MANY HAVE STATED THAT NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD RESOLUTION OF CLEAR POLICY CONFLICTS, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND, MORE BROADLY, OF ACCOMMODATION BY THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES TO THE MULTILATERALIST POINT OF VIEW ON DISARMAMENT, HAVE NOT MATERIALIZED. THERE HAVE BEEN GENERAL EXPRESSIONS OF DISAPPOINTMENT THAT SO LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN TWO MONTHS OF CONSIDERATION AND NEGOTIATIONS AT THE FOURTH AND FIFTH PREPCOMS. NEVERTHELESS, NON-ALIGNED STILL EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT US AND USSR WILL DEVELOP BEFORE OR AT SSOD SOME AGREED PROGRAM OF NEXT STEPS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD. THEY HAVE BROADLY HINTED THAT MANY OF THEIR MORE EXTREME SUGGESTIONS WOULD DISAPPEAR IF THIS OCCURS.

3. DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT: MOST PROGRESS IN THE DRAFTING GROUPS HAS TAKEN PLACE ON THE DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT. THE FIRST SECTION, "REVIEW AND APPRAISAL," IS ALMOST ENTIRELY CLEAR OF BRACKETS. IN THE SECOND SECTION, "GOALS AND PRIORITIES," THERE REMAIN SIGNIFICANT BRACKETS IN THE PARAGRAPHS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. OTHERWISE THE TEXT IS RELATIVELY CLEAR OF SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS. IN THE THIRD SECTION, "PRINCIPLES," THE MAIN SUBSTANTIVE BRACKETS ARE ON TREATMENT OF (A) NON-USE AND NON-THREAT OF USE OF FORCE, PARTICULARLY SECURITY ASSURANCES REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS; (B) NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES AND ZONES OF PEACE; (C) NON-PROLIFERATION AND ACCESS TO NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES; (D) COMPLIANCE WITH AND WIDER ACCESSION TO EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS; AND (E) THE QUESTION OF

MILITARY ALLIANCES AND THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY TROOPS ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE. PREPCOM CHAIRMAN STATED HIS VIEW THAT IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY FOR SSOD COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE TO SET UP SEPARATE DRAFTING GROUP

TO DEAL WITH UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN DECLARATION. HE BELIEVES THESE CAN BE WORKED OUT IN CONSULTATIONS AMONG MEMBER STATES AT SSOD.

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4. PROGRAM OF ACTION. WORK IN THIS GROUP INVOLVED CLARIFICATION AND SHARPENING OF VIEWPOINTS AND DEMANDS, BUT VIRTUALLY NO NEGOTIATION TO TRY TO BRIDGE OR RECONCILE THE DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT COULD BE INCLUDED IN A PROGRAM OF ACTION. THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES CLEARLY ARE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ASSURANCES.

5. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, THE NON-ALIGNED CONTINUED TO PRESS US TO AGREE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS, BEYOND SALT II AND CTB, ON A SERIES OF SPECIFIC ASPECTS INCLUDING CESSATION OF QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS; CESSATION OF R AND D RE NEW TYPES OF SYSTEMS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS; CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES; AND A "TIME BOUND PROGRAM" FOR BALANCED REDUCTION OF STOCKPILES AND THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS LEADING TO THEIR COMPLETE ELIMINATION. PAKISTAN AND MEXICO ARE ALSO PRESSING FOR PLEDGES TO WITHDRAW NUCLEAR ARMS DEPLOYMENTS FROM TERRITORIES OF OTHER STATES AND NOT TO EMBARK ON ANY NEW INSTALLATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOVIETS RETAINED THEIR TEXT FROM PREPCOM IV WHICH PROPOSES NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON SIMULTANEOUS CESSATION BY ALL STATES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION (THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL), SIMULTANEOUS UNDERTAKING TO BEGIN GRADUAL REDUCTION OF STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND AS A FIRST STEP AN AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR NEUTRON WEAPONS. EFFORTS AT THE DELEGATION LEVEL TO PRODUCE A JOINT US/SOVIET INTERIM TEXT ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT COLLAPSED WHEN SOVIETS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS

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FROM MOSCOW TO STICK WITH THEIR TEXT PENDING COMPLETION OF REVIEW OF SSOD PREPARATIONS. WESTERN TEXTS REMAIN BRIEF AND VERY GENERAL, AND NON-ALIGNED HAVE INDICATED THEIR UNACCEPTABILITY.

6. NON-ALIGNED REITERATED THEIR CALL FOR BINDING SECURITY

ASSURANCES FOR NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES BEYOND THE

FORMULATION IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S SPEECH TO THE 32ND UNGA. INDIA, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE NON-ALIGNED CONTACT GROUP, PRESSED FOR A TOTAL NON-USE COMMITMENT. PAKISTAN URGED, AS AN INTERIM STEP PENDING NEGOTIATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PROVIDE BINDING AND CREDIBLE GUARANTEES THAT THEY WILL NOT USE OR THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WHICH ARE NOT PARTY TO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. WESTERN ALLIES, INCLUDING FRG, WELCOMED UK TEXT ON SECURITY ASSURANCES, INTRODUCED ON LAST DAY OF DRAFTING WORK, AS EFFORT TO SET FORTH INTERIM WESTERN POSITION PENDING SSOD. UK AND FRG DELS INDICATED THAT THEY WILL RECOMMEND TO THEIR CAPITALS CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF SOME NEW FORMULATION TO BE MADE AT SSOD, AND ARE VERY INTERESTED IN REMAINING IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH US. WE BELIEVE THAT NEW AND MORE EXTENSIVE STATEMENT ON NON-USE, GOING BEYOND STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT AT 32ND UNGA, SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY CONSIDERATION IN OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION. ON RELATED SUBJECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES AND ZONES OF PEACE, ALL TEXTS REMAIN HEAVILY BRACKETED.

7. AS REGARDS CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, THERE ARE NOW ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS INCLUDING REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND/OR TRANSFER AS WELL AS MORE GENERAL FORMULATION ON RESTRAINING THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACE. JAPANESE DEL UNFORTUNATELY HAS BEEN MALADROIT  
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IN PRESENTING ITS VIEWS ON IMPORTANCE OF TRANSFER ISSUE. NON-ALIGNED HAVE INDICATED THAT THEIR ATTITUDE ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WILL BE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THEIR ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSIVENESS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO THEIR DEMANDS RE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ASSURANCES.

8. DISCUSSION ON NON-PROLIFERATION ONCE MORE UNDERSCORED NON-ALIGNED AND PAKISTANI VIEWPOINTS ON DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF NPT, LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE IV AND VI UNDERTAKINGS, AND DETERMINATION TO PRESS FOR SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS APPLIED EQUALLY TO ALL STATES AND ALL FACILITIES. THEY ALSO PRESSED AGAIN ON UNHINDERED ACCESS TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, PAKISTAN ASKED FOR CONSIDERATION OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM UNDER UN AUSPICES. US

AND WESTERN ALLIES PLUS SOVIETS URGED ENDORSEMENT OF NPT, STRENGTHENED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM AND MORE SUPPORT FOR IAEA, AND RESISTED NON-ALIGNED/PAKISTANI DEMANDS.

9. MACHINERY: DISARMAMENT MACHINERY GROUP SAW LITTLE IN THE WAY OF REAL NEGOTIATION. RATHER, GROUP USED MEETINGS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND ELABORATE PROPOSALS IN GREATER DETAIL. PRINCIPAL NEW ELEMENT TO EMERGE IS NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL FOR THE RECONVENING OF THE UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, WITH TERMS OF REFERENCE TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE SSOD AND THE ELABORATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT. INDIAN REP (VELLODI), WHO APPEARS TO BE DRIVING FORCE WITHIN NON-ALIGNED ON THIS ISSUE, APPARENTLY DECIDED TO PROPOSE RESURRECTION OF DISARMAMENT COMMISSION BECAUSE OF GENERAL CRITICISM OF HIS EARLIER PROPOSAL TO CREATE CONFIDENTIAL

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NEW DELIBERATIVE BODY AS WASTEFUL AND UNNECESSARY. WHILE LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS NEW PROPOSAL IS APPARENT OUTSIDE OF NON-ALIGNED GROUP, USDEL BELIEVES RECONVENING OF DISARMAMENT COMMISSION MAY BE ACCEPTABLE WAY OF MEETING NON-ALIGNED PRESSURE FOR CHANGE IN DISARMAMENT INSTITUTIONS SOVIETS HOWEVER SEEM DISTINCTLY UNINTERESTED.

10. OTHER NEW ELEMENTS IN MACHINERY TEXT ARE FRENCH PROPOSALS FOR CONVENING OF FIRST COMMITTEE "SITTING AS A DISARMAMENT COMMISSION," FOR CREATION OF A DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE AND FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND DISARMAMENT. THE FIRST FRENCH PROPOSAL APPEARS OVERTAKEN BY THE NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL FOR THE RECONVENING OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, A PROPOSAL TO WHICH THE FRENCH HAVE INDICATED THEY HAVE NO OBJECTION. THE SECOND FRENCH PROPOSAL, THAT A NEW NEGOTIATING BODY BE ESTABLISHED, HAS RECEIVED NO SUPPORT THUS FAR. NON-ALIGNED HAVE, HOWEVER, STRESSED NEED TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE POSSIBILITY OF FRENCH AND (THOUGH THIS IS VIEWED AS IMPROBABLE) CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN CCD. TO THIS END, MAIN NON-ALIGNED DEMAND HAS BEEN FOR ABOLITION OF CO-CHAIRMANSHIP WHICH THEY REJECT IN ANY CASE AS ANACHRONISTIC AND "UNDEMOCRATIC." LIKE FRENCH, NON-ALIGNED HAVE ALSO PROPOSED A CLOSER LINK BETWEEN THE UN AND THE NEGOTIATING BODY. HOWEVER, IT NOW APPEARS THAT NON-ALIGNED DO NOT SEEK TO TRANSFORM THIS LINK IN A WAY WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE AUTONOMY AND CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING OF CCD,

(THOUGH NON-ALIGNED WANT TO TIGHTEN UN/CCD LINK IN SOME FASHION AND SOME NON-ALIGNED APPARENTLY PREFER THAT THE CONSENSUS PRACTICE OF CCD BE CONFINED TO NON-PROCEDURAL DECISIONS ONLY). THUS FAR THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REACTION TO FINAL FRENCH PROPOSAL ON CREATION OF RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

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11. AS THEY STATED DURING OUR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON FEBRUARY 5, SOVIET STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO STAND PAT ON MACHINERY IN BELIEF THAT CONCESSIONS COULD BE MORE USEFULLY MADE AT SSOD ITSELF, IF AT ALL. ACCORDINGLY, SOVIETS RESISTED ANY CHANGES IN CCD LINK TO UN OR IN CCD ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES. SOVIETS REACTED WITH SKEPTICISM TO NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL RE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AND TO FRENCH PROPOSAL RE NEW NEGOTIATING BODY. THE SOVIETS ALSO RESISTED FORMULATIONS CALLING FOR STRENGTHENING OR APPEARING TO INCREASE AUTONOMY OF UN DISARMAMENT CENTER, IN PART NO DOUBT BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR OF LONGSTANDING NONALIGNED DESIRE TO GIVE AUTONOMY TO AND CONSEQUENTLY LESSEN SOVIET INFLUENCE OVER CENTER, AUGMENTED PERHAPS BY SENSITIVITIES RELATED TO THE SHEVCHENKO AFFAIR. SOVIETS STILL WANT A FOLLOW-ON WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, BUT THIS HAD ELICITED LITTLE SUPPORT OUTSIDE OF EASTERN GROUP.

12. AT SSOD THE PRINCIPAL MACHINERY ISSUES THEREFORE WILL BE (1) CCD ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES, NOTABLY CHAIRMANSHIP OF THAT BODY, AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF UN (FIRST COMMITTEE OR DISARMAMENT COMMISSION) TO NEGOTIATING BODY, (2) REVIVAL OF UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, AND (3) FOLLOW-ON TO SSOD I -- SSOD II OR WDC. USDEL BELIEVES NONE OF THESE ISSUES IS INTRACTABLE, ALTHOUGH THEIR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE CLOSE US CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER KEY ACTORS. NON-ALIGNED ARE AWARE OF US FLEXIBILITY ON CCD COCHAIRMANSHIP, WHICH WE SEE AS FINAL ELEMENT OF SETTLEMENT ON MACHINERY.

23. POST-PREPCOM EXPECTATIONS ABOUT SSOD: A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS HAVE EXPRESSED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF BRIDGING THE DIFFERENCES WHICH  
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REMAIN IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT THROUGH THE PROCESS OF CONSENSUS. IN DRAFTING GROUP ON DECLARATION, FOR EXAMPLE, BRAZILIAN AND MEXICAN REPS BEGAN TO REFER,

TOWARD END OF SESSION, OF POSSIBLE NEED TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES AT SSOD BY VOTING. IN ADDITION, AT END OF CONSIDERATION OF FINAL REPORT ON THURSDAY, APRIL 20, BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WHILE PREPCOM HAS BEEN WORKING ON BASIS THAT THERE WOULD BE SINGLE FINAL DOCUMENT, COMPOSED OF FOUR PARTS, IT WOULD BE REGRETTABLE IF CERTAIN COUNTRIES WHICH COULD NOT ACCEPT FORMULATIONS IN ONLY ONE PART OF THE DOCUMENT WOULD HAVE, THEREFORE, TO OPPOSE AND REJECT ENTIRE TEXT. ALSO IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES

OF NON-ALIGNED, QUESTION OF "RECOURSE TO VOTING" SEEMS A PREOCCUPATION GIVEN PRESENT LACK OF PROGRESS, PARTICULARLY ON PROGRAM OF ACTION AND MACHINERY DOCUMENTS.

14. USDEL BELIEVES THESE CONCERNS ARE REAL, AND FURTHER BELIEVES THAT VOTING ON ANY PART OF FINAL DOCUMENT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE CHARACTER OF THE DOCUMENTS. ALL DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE HAVE BEEN ON BASIS OF CONSENSUS. STATES, THEREFORE, HAVE BEEN WILLING TO GIVE UP THEIR OWN POSITIONS ON CERTAIN MATTERS IN AN EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT OF GROUP. SHOULD PROCESS OF CONSENSUS BREAK DOWN AT ANY POINT, WE BELIEVE ALL STATES WOULD BE FORCED TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITIONS ON SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF TEXT. SUCH AN EVENTUALITY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LEAD TO SERIOUS WORSENING OF ATMOSPHERE AND RESULT IN CONTENTIOUS DEBATE.

15. MANY MEMBERS OF THE UN ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE PASSIVE US ROLE, PARTICULARLY REGARDING PROGRAM OF ACTION. THEY HAVE BEEN EXPECTING A MORE ACTIVE US LEADERSHIP ROLE THAN HAS BEEN POSSIBLE. AT  
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THE SAME TIME THERE IS CONSTANT AND DEEPLY ROOTED SUSPICION THAT US AND USSR ARE IN BASIC AGREEMENT ABOUT LIMITING THE ROLE OF THE UN AND PARTICULARLY THE SSOD IN DISARMAMENT MATTERS AND IN ADDITION ARE SUSTAINING A CLOSED ATTITUDE ABOUT MEETING THE DESIRES OF THE OTHER MEMBERS FOR PROGRESS AND FOR PARTICIPATION IN ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. THERE IS ALSO A FEELING THAT THE US, INSTEAD OF STATING ITS OWN POSITION ON ISSUES, HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF MERELY REACTING TO THE EFFORTS OF OTHERS.

16. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD EXPECTATION HERE FOR QUITE SOME TIME THAT EITHER A SALT II OR CTB AGREEMENT WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE SPECIAL SESSION. THE ABSENCE OF POSITIVE RESULTS ON THESE NEGOTIATIONS INEVITABLY WILL INFLUENCE THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE SSOD. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT OUR PLENARY STATEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE SOME DESCRIPTION OF WHERE THESE NEGOTIATIONS STAND.

17. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SSOD AS THE LARGEST DISARMAMENT GATHERING OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD, THE HIGH STANDING ACCORDED ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT THAT WILL ADDRESS THE SSOD, THERE IS AN ALMOST UNIVERSAL ASSUMPTION AMONG UN MEMBERS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL ADDRESS THE SPECIAL SESSION. USDEL BELIEVES THAT IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL SSOD AND FOR GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR

ARMS CONTROL POLICIES THAT THE PRESIDENT ADDRESS THE  
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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 106255

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FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM USUN NEW YORK DATED APRIL 22, 1978  
SENT SECSTATE WASHDC INFO GENEVA, USNATO, BELGRADE,  
BUCHAREST, LONDON, NEW DELHI, PARIS IS REPEATED TO  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 01624

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NEVERTHELESS, NON-ALIGNED STILL EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT US AND USSR WILL DEVELOP BEFORE OR AT SSOD SOME AGREED PROGRAM OF NEXT STEPS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD. THEY HAVE BROADLY HINTED THAT MANY OF THEIR MORE EXTREME SUGGESTIONS WOULD DISAPPEAR IF THIS OCCURS.

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OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES; AND A "TIME BOUND PROGRAM" FOR BALANCED REDUCTION OF STOCKPILES AND THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS LEADING TO THEIR COMPLETE ELIMINATION. PAKISTAN AND MEXICO ARE ALSO PRESSING FOR PLEDGES TO WITHDRAW NUCLEAR ARMS DEPLOYMENTS FROM TERRITORIES OF OTHER STATES AND NOT TO EMBARK ON ANY NEW INSTALLATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOVIETS RETAINED THEIR TEXT FROM PREPCOM IV WHICH PROPOSES NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON SIMULTANEOUS CESSATION BY ALL STATES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION (THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL), SIMULTANEOUS UNDERTAKING TO BEGIN GRADUAL REDUCTION OF STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND AS A FIRST STEP AN AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR NEUTRON WEAPONS. EFFORTS AT THE DELEGATION LEVEL TO PRODUCE A JOINT US/SOVIET INTERIM TEXT ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT COLLAPSED WHEN SOVIETS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW TO STICK WITH THEIR TEXT PENDING COMPLETION OF REVIEW OF SSOD PREPARATIONS. WESTERN TEXTS REMAIN BRIEF AND VERY GENERAL, AND NON-ALIGNED HAVE INDICATED THEIR UNACCEPTABILITY.

6. NON-ALIGNED REITERATED THEIR CALL FOR BINDING SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES BEYOND THE

FORMULATION IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S SPEECH TO THE 32ND UNGA. INDIA, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE NON-ALIGNED CONTACT GROUP, PRESSED FOR A TOTAL NON-USE COMMITMENT. PAKISTAN URGED, AS AN INTERIM STEP PENDING NEGOTIATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PROVIDE BINDING AND CREDIBLE GUARANTEES THAT THEY WILL NOT USE OR THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WHICH ARE NOT PARTY TO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. WESTERN ALLIES, INCLUDING FRG, WELCOMED UK TEXT ON SECURITY ASSURANCES, INTRODUCED ON LAST CONFIDENTIAL

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DAY OF DRAFTING WORK, AS EFFORT TO SET FORTH INTERIM WESTERN POSITION PENDING SSOD. UK AND FRG DELS INDICATED THAT THEY WILL RECOMMEND TO THEIR CAPITALS CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF SOME NEW FORMULATION TO BE MADE AT SSOD, AND ARE VERY INTERSTED IN REMAINING IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH US. WE BELIEVE THAT NEW AND MORE EXTENSIVE STATEMENT ON NON-USE, GOING BEYOND STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT AT 32ND UNGA, SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY CONSIDERATION IN OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION. ON RELATED SUBJECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES AND ZONES OF PEACE, ALL TEXTS REMAIN HEAVILY BRACKETED.

7. AS REGARDS CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, THERE ARE NOW ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS INCLUDING REFERENCES TO INTER-

NATIONAL PRODUCTION AND/OR TRANSFER AS WELL AS MORE GENERAL FORMULATION ON RESTRAINING THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACE. JAPANESE DEL UNFORTUNATELY HAS BEEN MALADROIT IN PRESENTING ITS VIEWS ON IMPORTANCE OF TRANSFER ISSUE. NON-ALIGNED HAVE INDICATED THAT THEIR ATTITUDE ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WILL BE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THEIR ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSIVENESS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO THEIR DEMANDS RE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ASSURANCES.

8. DISCUSSION ON NON-PROLIFERATION ONCE MORE UNDERSCORED NON-ALIGNED AND PAKISTANI VIEWPOINTS ON DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF NPT, LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE IV AND VI UNDERTAKINGS, AND DETERMINATION TO PRESS FOR SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS APPLIED EQUALLY TO ALL STATES AND ALL FACILITIES. THEY ALSO PRESSED AGAIN ON UNHINDERED ACCESS TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, PAKISTAN ASKED FOR CONSIDERATION OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM UNDER UN AUSPICES. US CONFIDENTIAL

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AND WESTERN ALLIES PLUS SOVIETS URGED ENDORSEMENT OF NPT, STRENGTHENED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM AND MORE SUPPORT FOR IAEA, AND RESISTED NON-ALIGNED/PAKISTANI DEMANDS.

9. MACHINERY: DISARMAMENT MACHINERY GROUP SAW LITTLE IN THE WAY OF REAL NEGOTIATION. RATHER, GROUP USED MEETINGS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND ELABORATE PROPOSALS IN GREATER DETAIL. PRINCIPAL NEW ELEMENT TO EMERGE IS NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL FOR THE RECONVENING OF THE UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, WITH TERMS OF REFERENCE TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE SSOD AND THE ELABORATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT. INDIAN REP (VELLODI), WHO APPEARS TO BE DRIVING FORCE WITHIN NON-ALIGNED ON THIS ISSUE, APPARENTLY DECIDED TO PROPOSE RESURRECTION OF DISARMAMENT COMMISSION BECAUSE OF GENERAL CRITICISM OF HIS EARLIER PROPOSAL TO CREATE NEW DELIBERATIVE BODY AS WASTEFUL AND UNNECESSARY. WHILE LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS NEW PROPOSAL IS APPARENT OUTSIDE OF NON-ALIGNED GROUP, USDEL BELIEVES RECONVENING OF DISARMAMENT COMMISSION MAY BE ACCEPTABLE WAY OF MEETING NON-ALIGNED PRESSURE FOR CHANGE IN DISARMAMENT INSTITUTIONS SOVIETS HOWEVER SEEM DISTINCTLY UNINTERESTED.

10. OTHER NEW ELEMENTS IN MACHINERY TEXT ARE FRENCH PROPOSALS FOR CONVENING OF FIRST COMMITTEE "SITTING AS A DISARMAMENT COMMISSION," FOR CREATION OF A DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE AND FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND DISARMAMENT. THE FIRST FRENCH PROPOSAL APPEARS OVERTAKEN BY THE NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL FOR THE RECONVENING OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, A PROPOSAL TO WHICH THE FRENCH HAVE INDICATED THEY HAVE

NO OBJECTION. THE SECOND FRENCH PROPOSAL, THAT A NEW NEGOTIATING BODY BE ESTABLISHED, HAS RECEIVED NO SUPPORT THUS FAR. NON-ALIGNED HAVE, HOWEVER, STRESSED NEED TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE POSSIBILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL

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FRENCH AND (THOUGH THIS IS VIEWED AS IMPROBABLE) CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN CCD. TO THIS END, MAIN NON-ALIGNED DEMAND HAS BEEN FOR ABOLITION OF CO-CHAIRMANSHIP WHICH THEY REJECT IN ANY CASE AS ANACHRONISTIC AND "UNDEMOCRATIC." LIKE FRENCH, NON-ALIGNED HAVE ALSO PROPOSED A CLOSER LINK BETWEEN THE UN AND THE NEGOTIATING BODY. HOWEVER, IT NOW APPEARS THAT NON-ALIGNED DO NOT SEEK TO TRANSFORM THIS LINK IN A WAY WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE AUTONOMY AND CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING OF CCD,

(THOUGH NON-ALIGNED WANT TO TIGHTEN UN/CCD LINK IN SOME FASHION AND SOME NON-ALIGNED APPARENTLY PREFER THAT THE CONSENSUS PRACTICE OF CCD BE CONFINED TO NON-PROCEDURAL DECISIONS ONLY). THUS FAR THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REACTION TO FINAL FRENCH PROPOSAL ON CREATION OF RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

11. AS THEY STATED DURING OUR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON FEBRUARY 5, SOVIET STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO STAND PAT ON MACHINERY IN BELIEF THAT CONCESSIONS COULD BE MORE USEFULLY MADE AT SSOD ITSELF, IF AT ALL. ACCORDINGLY, SOVIETS RESISTED ANY CHANGES IN CCD LINK TO UN OR IN CCD ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES. SOVIETS REACTED WITH SKEPTICISM TO NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL RE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AND TO FRENCH PROPOSAL RE NEW NEGOTIATING BODY. THE SOVIETS ALSO RESISTED FORMULATIONS CALLING FOR STRENGTHENING OR APPEARING TO INCREASE AUTONOMY OF UN DISARMAMENT CENTER, IN PART NO DOUBT BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR OF LONGSTANDING NONALIGNED DESIRE TO GIVE AUTONOMY TO AND CONSEQUENTLY LESSEN SOVIET INFLUENCE OVER CENTER, AUGMENTED PERHAPS BY SENSITIVITIES RELATED TO THE SHEVCHENKO AFFAIR. SOVIETS STILL WANT A FOLLOW-ON WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, BUT THIS HAD ELICITED LITTLE CONFIDENTIAL

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SUPPORT OUTSIDE OF EASTERN GROUP.

12. AT SSOD THE PRINCIPAL MACHINERY ISSUES THEREFORE WILL BE (1) CCD ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES, NOTABLY CHAIRMANSHIP OF THAT BODY, AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF UN (FIRST COMMITTEE OR DISARMAMENT COMMISSION) TO NEGOTIATING BODY, (2) REVIVAL OF UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION.

AND (3) FOLLOW-ON TO SSOD I -- SSOD II OR WDC. USDEL

BELIEVES NONE OF THESE ISSUES IS INTRACTABLE, ALTHOUGH THEIR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE CLOSE US CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER KEY ACTORS. NON-ALIGNED ARE AWARE OF US FLEXIBILITY ON CCD COCHAIRMANSHIP, WHICH WE SEE AS FINAL ELEMENT OF SETTLEMENT ON MACHINERY.

23. POST-PREPCOM EXPECTATIONS ABOUT SSOD: A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS HAVE EXPRESSED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF BRIDGING THE DIFFERENCES WHICH REMAIN IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT THROUGH THE PROCESS OF CONSENSUS. IN DRAFTING GROUP ON DECLARATION, FOR EXAMPLE, BRAZILIAN AND MEXICAN REPS BEGAN TO REFER,

TOWARD END OF SESSION, OF POSSIBLE NEED TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES AT SSOD BY VOTING. IN ADDITION, AT END OF CONSIDERATION OF FINAL REPORT ON THURSDAY, APRIL 20, BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WHILE PREPCOM HAS BEEN WORKING ON BASIS THAT THERE WOULD BE SINGLE FINAL DOCUMENT, COMPOSED OF FOUR PARTS, IT WOULD BE REGRETTABLE IF CERTAIN COUNTRIES WHICH COULD NOT ACCEPT FORMULATIONS IN ONLY ONE PART OF THE DOCUMENT WOULD HAVE, THEREFORE, TO OPPOSE AND REJECT ENTIRE TEXT. ALSO IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF NON-ALIGNED, QUESTION OF "RECOURSE TO VOTING" SEEMS A PREOCCUPATION GIVEN PRESENT LACK OF PROGRESS, PARTICULARLY ON PROGRAM OF ACTION AND MACHINERY DOCUMENTS.

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14. USDEL BELIEVES THESE CONCERNS ARE REAL, AND FURTHER BELIEVES THAT VOTING ON ANY PART OF FINAL DOCUMENT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE CHARACTER OF THE DOCUMENTS. ALL DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE HAVE BEEN ON BASIS OF CONSENSUS. STATES, THEREFORE, HAVE BEEN WILLING TO GIVE UP THEIR OWN POSITIONS ON CERTAIN MATTERS IN AN EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT OF GROUP. SHOULD PROCESS OF CONSENSUS BREAK DOWN AT ANY POINT, WE BELIEVE ALL STATES WOULD BE FORCED TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITIONS ON SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF TEXT. SUCH AN EVENTUALITY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LEAD TO SERIOUS WORSENING OF ATMOSPHERE AND RESULT IN CONTENTIOUS DEBATE.

15. MANY MEMBERS OF THE UN ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE PASSIVE US ROLE, PARTICULARLY REGARDING PROGRAM OF ACTION. THEY HAVE BEEN EXPECTING A MORE ACTIVE US LEADERSHIP ROLE THAN HAS BEEN POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS CONSTANT AND DEEPLY ROOTED SUSPICION THAT US AND USSR ARE IN BASIC AGREEMENT ABOUT LIMITING THE ROLE OF THE UN AND PARTICULARLY THE SSOD IN DISARMAMENT MATTERS AND IN ADDITION ARE SUSTAINING A CLOSED ATTITUDE ABOUT MEETING THE DESIRES OF THE OTHER MEMBERS FOR PROGRESS AND FOR PARTICIPATION IN ARMS CONTROL

EFFORTS. THERE IS ALSO A FEELING THAT THE US,  
INSTEAD OF STATING ITS OWN POSITION ON ISSUES, HAS ADOPTED  
A POLICY OF MERELY REACTING TO THE EFFORTS OF OTHERS.

16. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THERE HAS BEEN WIDE-  
SPREAD EXPECTATION HERE FOR QUITE SOME TIME THAT EITHER  
A SALT II OR CTB AGREEMENT WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE  
SPECIAL SESSION. THE ABSENCE OF POSITIVE RESULTS ON THESE  
NEGOTIATIONS INEVITABLY WILL INFLUENCE THE ATMOSPHERE  
AT THE SSOD. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT OUR PLENARY  
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STATEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE SOME DESCRIPTION OF WHERE THESE  
NEGOTIATIONS STAND.

17. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SSOD AS THE LARGEST DISARMA-  
MENT GATHERING OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD, THE HIGH STANDING  
ACCORDED ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S  
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF HEADS OF GOVERN-  
MENT THAT WILL ADDRESS THE SSOD, THERE IS AN ALMOST UNI-  
VERSAL ASSUMPTION AMONG UN MEMBERS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL  
ADDRESS THE SPECIAL SESSION. USDEL BELIEVES THAT IT IS  
OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL  
SSOD AND FOR GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR  
ARMS CONTROL POLICIES THAT THE PRESIDENT ADDRESS THE  
SPECIAL SESSION. YOUNG UNQUOTE VANCE

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